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I. Introduction
From the beginning of its relations with the Western powers in the
mid-19th century, China has suffered enormous humiliation from the
effects of "unequal treaties"' concluded with Russia. Peking's warlord
government as well as the Nationalist and Communist regimes have
been obsessed with the situation. In fact, the unequal treaties were
among the paramount causes for the republican and Communist revo-
lutions.' By 1943, the Nationalist government concluded some new
and equal treaties with several Western Powers replacing older treaties,
but it had to sign a new, unequal treaty in 1945 with the Soviet Union
as prearranged by the Yalta Agreements When the Communists
came to power in 1949, the Chinese government had to accept restric-
tions imposed by the 1945 Treaty and several older treaties, especially
those concerning the borderlands. 4 The new government also entered
into a treaty with the Soviets. Acceptance of the treaty restrictions
1. See CHIANG KAI-SHEK, CHINA'S DESTINY 51-67, 76-107 (1947); seegeneraly. Cm-
ANG KAI-SHEK, SOvIET RussiA IN CHINA (1957).
2. SUN YAT-SEN, THREE PRINCIPLES OF THE PEOPLE (SAN MIN CiU 1) 15-95 (1932);
HsIAO YU, MAO-TsE-TUNG AND I WERE BEGGARS 55-88 (1959).
3. Treaty of Friendship and Alliance Between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R.,
Aug. 14, 1945, China-U.S.S.R. English text in R. GARTHOFF, SINo-SoViE'r MILITARY RE-
LATIONS 203-213 app. A (1966) [hereinafter cited as GARTHOFF].
4. See notes 35-38 infra.
5. Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance Between the People's Re-
public of China and the U.S.S.R., Feb. 15, 1950, China-U.S.S.R., and related agreements of
1950, 1952, 1954, reprinted in GARTHOFF, supra note 3, at 214-221 app. B.
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accounts in part for the present Peking Government's difficulties and
disputes with Russia.
At present, no acceptable definition of "unequal treaty" has been
advanced. Any treaty between or among nations which purports to
reach agreement when the parties are not on equal footing in accord-
ance with" the principles of international law is an "unequal treaty".
This definition includes treaties founded on grants of special position,
privileges, spheres of influence and especially, territories taken away
from one nation by another.
Both the Nationalist Chinese Treaty of 19456 and the Communist
Chinese treaty of 19507 can be considered "unequal treaties", although
the terms of the latter instrument are somewhat less unequal. Evi-
dently, common Marxist ideology and Soviet Communist brotherhood
are not persuasive influences when national interest is involved.
Credit must be given to the Chinese Communist regime in its ef-
fort to rid China of unequal diplomatic and political treatment by Rus-
sia. By 1955, the Soviet special position in Manchuria, including the
Port Arthur Naval Base' and the Chinese Changchun Railway, 9 was
relinquished. In the Sinkiang area, the Soviets also abolished the Sino-
Soviet joint stock companies' 0 established in 1950 for the exploitation
of oil, minerals and other resources. Thus ended the long involvement
of Russia in Chinese internal affairs and China regained complete sov-
ereignty in these areas. Mongolia, however, completely separated itself
from China while maintaining nominal independence in the Soviet or-
bit.
The five years of 1950-1955 were comfortable ones in the new
Sino-Soviet relations. The Russians provided some economic and tech-
nical aid to China and Chinese "volunteers" were fighting in Korea at
the behest of Stalin. But signs of strain were becoming apparent. First,
Mao Tse-tung spent sixty days negotiating the Sino-Soviet treaty" at a
6. Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, supra note 3.
7. Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, supra note 5.
8. Port Arthur comprised an area of 1,338 square miles with a population of 1,370,000.
The special position which Russia had enjoyed in Manchuria allowed the Soviets to main-
tain and deploy their army, navy and air force in the Port Arthur area.
9. The Soviets enjoyed the joint ownership and administration of the Chinese
Changchum Railway, formerly the Chinese Eastern Railway, which traverses both North
and South Manchuria.
10. On March 27, 1950, China had signed with Russia the following agreements: (1)
Sino-Soviet Joint Stock Company for Exploration of Petroleum; (2) Sino-Soviet Joint Stock
Company for Prospect of Nonferrous and Rare Metals; (3) Sino-Soviet Joint Stock Com-
pany for Civil Aviation (over routes: Peking-Chita, Peking-Irkutsk and Peking-Alma-Ata).
11. Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, stra note 5.
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time when he was needed in China. Detailed information about the
negotiations is still not available, but the long negotiating period indi-
cates that difficult bargaining sessions were necessary to effect the
treaty. Second, the Russians originally had promised to return the Port
Arthur base to China by the end of 1952 but they retained control of
the base until 1955, ostensibly by "invitation" of the Chinese. Russia
continued practicing a century-old imperialism while China was cham-
pioning territorial integrity and sovereign equality. China was no
longer a weakened political power vying against a strong Russia; both
were now dynamic powers. By 1956-1957, the strained relations be-
tween the two neighboring powers erupted into a pronounced split both
in Marxist ideology and in Sino-Soviet border policies for disputed
frontiers. The Western world learned of the ideological disharmony
long before news of the border dispute was allowed out of the Sino-
Soviet political arena. Both sides maintained a policy of strict secrecy
regarding the frontier disagreements. Chou En-lai later stated that "the
issue was kept secret because the Sino-Soviet dispute was not public at
the time."' 2
The Sino-Russian frontier problem is particularly important not
only because Russia is a super power but also because the two countries
share the longest land boundary in the world. Its total length is ap-
proximately 5,500 miles: 2,000 miles in Manchuria, 2,000 miles in Sin-
kiang and 1,500 miles with Outer Mongolia which is, in effect, a part of
the Soviet Union. This article will explore some of the problems in-
volved in the resolution of disputes over this extremely long boundary
between China and the Soviet Union.
I. Chinese Territorial Claims against Russia
A. Development of the Claims
The Western world began to learn of the Chinese-Soviet territorial
question in 1962-1963. Mao Tse-tung finally brought the problem into
the open when he talked to a Japanese Socialist Party delegation in
Peking on July 10, 1964. In the interview, he supported Japanese
claims to the Kurile Islands and criticized the Soviet Union for its terri-
torial ambitions.
There are too many places occupied by the Soviet Union. In accord-
ance with the Yalta Agreement, the Soviet Union, under the pretext
of assuring the independence of Mongolia, actually placed the coun-
12. Interview with Chou En-lai in Tokyo (Aug. 1, 1964), reprinted in D. DooauN, TER-
RrroRiAL CLAIMS IN THE SINO-SovIET CONFLIcT 46 (1965) [hereinafter cited as DOOUN].
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try under its domination. . . . In 1954, when Khrushchev and Bul-
ganin came to China, we took up this question but they refused to
talk to us. . . Some people have declared that the Sinkiang area
and the territories north of the Amur River must be included in the
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is concentrating troops along its
border. 13
In his criticism, Mao emphasized three points: (1) the 1954 Soviet
domination of Mongolia, (2) the Soviet Union designs in Sinkiang and
territories north of the Amur River and (3) the concentration of Soviet
troops along the Chinese border which posed a threat to Peking.
In the same interview, Mao also indicated that the Soviet Union,
which has an area of 22 million square kilometers and a population of
only 220 million, has an unusually light population density. Mao
stated that Russia would have to account for the territories which
China had lost to Russia.
About a hundred years ago, the area to the east of (Lake) Baikal
became Russian territory, and since then Vladivostok, Khabarovsk,
Kamchatka and other areas have become Soviet territory. We have
not yet presented our account for this list. 4
On July 19, Chou En-lai in supporting Mao's claim, revealed that
in January, 1957, he had raised the territorial issues covering Japan,
China, the Middle East and the Eastern European countries including
Finland. He also could not get a satisfactory answer from the Russians
through Khrushchev.15 Thus the Sino-Soviet territorial disputes devel-
oped in 1954, two years before the ideological split in 1956.
The first open disagreement on the territorial issue resulted from
the Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962. At the time of the crisis,
China and India were in the midst of a frontier war. Russia supported
India and reproached China for its position. In response, the Chinese
criticized Soviet "adventurism" in stationing missiles in Cuba and
"capitulationism" in removing.the missiles to avert a possible nuclear
collision with the United States. Subsequently, Khrushchev attacked
the Chinese stand with regard to Hong Kong and Macao as being a
"double standard" because it represented remnants of colonialism.16
13. Excerpts from Chairman Mao Tse-tung Tells the Delegation of the Japanese Soc/al/st
Party that the Kuriles Must Be Returned to Japan, reprinted in DooLIN, supra note 12, at 43,
(Text of the interview first appeared in Sekai Shh6, Tokyo, Aug. 11, 1964).
14. Id. at 44.
15. Id. at 45-46.
16. Id. at 28. "But does anyone accuse China because remnants of colonialism remain
[Vol, 3
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The Chinese reacted sharply.17 In an official editorial addressed to
the Soviets, the Chinese Communist Party brought up the subject of the
unequal treaties. The Party listed nine treaties, three of which were
imposed upon China by Czarist Russia, and which remained in force
despite the Karakhan declarations.18 The Chinese statement ended on
a threatening note which challenged Russia to consider that opening
the Hong Kong and Macao questions might force a reconsideration of
unequal treaties per se. 19
The first unofficial accounts of border violations between Russia
and China appeared shortly after the Chinese editorial statement. The
Jen-Min Jilh-Pao20 and Hung-chil jointly stated that in April and May
1962, the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party used their personnel in
Sinkiang to carry out "large-scale subversive activities in the Ill region
and enticed and coerced several tens of thousands of Chinese citizens
into going to the Soviet Union."'2 In reply, the Soviets accused the
Chinese of provoking more" than 5,000 border incidents in the single
year of 1962.P
On January 3, 1964, Khrushchev sent a message to the heads of
state of other countries proposing an international agreement or treaty
on the renunciation of the use of force in resolving territorial disputes
or questions of frontiers. The Sino-Indian frontier war had just been
concluded and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party in a letter to its Soviet counterpart compared the Soviet leaders to
the "reactionary nationalists of India who have deliberately created
border disputes with China."2 4 The letter declared that China had sat-
isfactorily settled complicated boundary questions with Burma, Nepal,
untouched on her territory? It would be incorrect to prod China into taking actions that she
regards as premature." Id.
17. A Comment on the Statement of the Communist Partqy f the U.S4., Jen-Min Jih-
Pao, Mar. 8, 1963.
18. Text reprinted in Sino-Russian Relations, The Karakhan Declarations o( 1919 & 1920
[1924] CHINA YEARBOOK 868-87.
19. Excerpts from A Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of the United
States of America (editorial) Jen-Min Jih-Pao, Mar. 8, 1963, rep rinted in DOupN, .rnra note
12, at 29-31. "You are not unaware that such questions as those of Hong Kong and Macao
relate to the category of unequal treaties left over by history, treaties which the imperialists
imposed on China. It may be asked: In raising questions of this kind, do you intend to raise
all the questions of unequal treaties and have a general settlement? Has it ever entered your
heads what the consequences will be?" Id.
20. The English translation of Jen-Min Jih-Pao is The People's Daily.
21. The English translation of Hung-chi is The Liberation Army Daily.
22. English text of the joint statement in 37 Peking Review 6-23 (1963).
23. DOOLIN, supra note 12, at 32.
24. Letter of Feb. 29, 1964 reprinted in 19 Peking Review 12-18 (1964).
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Pakistan, and Afghanistan.25 In addition, the letter disclosed that the
Chinese and Soviet Governments' delegations had started boundary
negotiations in Peking on February 25, 1964. China reiterated its stand
on this issue, "Although the old treaties relating to the Sino-Russian
boundary are unequal treaties, the Chinese Government is nevertheless
willing to respect them and take them as the basis for a reasonable
settlement of the Sino-Soviet boundary question." 26
Prior to the Sino-Soviet negotiations in Peking, the Soviet Union
opposed the Chinese position concerning the borders by denying that
the 19th century border treaties were "unequal". The Soviets flatly de-
clared that they had no territorial conflicts with an) of their neighbor-
ing states.27 In a speech to the Central Committee of the Soviet
Communist Party on February 14, 1964, Mikhail Suslov, an influential
member of the Soviet Presidium, assailed the Chinese violation of bor-
der lines and declared that "our standpoint is that any territorial prob-
lem between Soviet Russia and China does not exist, and that the Sino-
Soviet border is historical and habitual. . . only those particular local-
ities which are controversial in nature can be respectively examined. ' 28
Thus the boundary negotiations initially were doomed to failure and
were broken off without results in September, 1964.
In response to the statement by Chairman Mao concerning the his-
torical bases of China's border claims, Pravda issued a lengthy editorial
on September 2, 1964, charging the Chinese with an expansionist pro-
gram with far-reaching pretensions designed to acquire lebensraum in
Soviet territory.2 9 The editorial refuted the historical arguments ad-
vanced by China by pointing out that those arguments were not factu-
ally accurate.
It is well known that in the middle of the Seventeenth century
China's possessions reached only to the Khingan Mountain Range,
i.e., considerably to the south of the Amur River. The territories to
the north of Khingan were populated by local indigenous tribes-
25. Id.
26. See Clubb, Armed Conflict in Chinese Borderlands 1917-50, reprinted in GARTIOFV,
supra note 3, at 9-19. See also Soviet letter to China, Nov. 29, 1963, in F. WATSON, TlE
FRONTIERS OF CHINA 178 (1966). "Any attempt to ignore historically-formed boundaries
between States can become the source of misunderstandings and conflicts." Id. at 179.
(Note that it is common practice for the Soviet and the Chinese Communist parties to ex-
change views by letter).
27. Le Monde, Apr. 11, 1969, at 2, col. 5.
28. TSAI PING-YUAN, AN ANALYTICAL SURVEY OF BORDER DISPUTES BETWEEN So-
VIET RUSSIA AND COMMUNIST CHINA 7 (1965). Jen-Min Jih-Pao editorially criticized this
speech in an article entitled Anti-Chinese Report, Apr. 27, 1964.
29. Pravda, Sept. 2, 1964, English text in DOOLIN, supra note 12, at 47-57.
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Evenks, Daurs, and so forth-who were subjected from time to time
to raids by the Manchu and Chinese population in the Amur Valley.
The process of the definition of actual borders took place with the
annexation by Russia of the northern half of the Amur Basin and of
the southern part by China. More than a hundred years ago, this
state of the border was fixed in the Aigun and Peking treaties...
Have those who question the inclusion in the Soviet Union of terri-
tory of more than one and a half million square kilometers consid-
ered how these claims will be taken by Soviet people who have lived
and worked on this land for several generations and consider it their
homeland, the land of their ancestors? That is why we say that the
present border has developed historically and was fixed by life itself,
and past treaties regarding the border cannot be disregarded.
30
The editorial also attacked Mao's assessment of Outer Mongolia.
Everybody knows that the Mongolian People's Republic has been a
sovereign socialist state for more than forty years and enjoys all the
rights to settle their destiny themselves. ... N. S. Khrushchev natu-
rally refused to discuss.., and told the Chinese leaders that the
destiny of the Mongolian people is not determined in Peking or Mos-
cow but in Ulan Bator and that the question of Mongolia's statehood
can be settled only by that country's working people and nobody
else.3
1
Although the Pravda editorial did mention Sinkiang, apparently
Khrushchev thought that it should not be omitted. When he gave an
interview to a Japanese Diet delegation on September 19, 1964, he sin-
gled Sinkiang out.
Let us take Sinkiang, for example. Have the Chinese been living
there from time immemorial? The Sinkiang indigenous population
differs sharply from the Chinese ethnically, linguistically and in
other respects. Chinese emperors conquered them in the past and
deprived them of their independence.
32
Khrushchev's statement infuriated the Chinese Communists because it
claimed that Sinkiang did not belong to China. Saifudin, Chairman of
the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region answered Khrushchev on
October 1, 1964, in one of the fiercest statements in the Sino-Soviet
conflict.
If the Khrushchev revisionists dare to stretch out their evil hands to
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Tass International Service, Moscow, Sept. 19, 1964, reprinted in in DOOWN, supra
note 12, at 70-71.
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invade and occupy our territory, they will certainly be repulsed ...
Their evil hands will be cut off as relentlessly as were those of the
Indian reactionaries when they invaded China.33
Sinkiang, Outer Mogolia and Manchuria were the main frontier
regions in which borders were contested by Russian and Chinese pow-
ers, and China had decided to reclaim the lost territories along these
frontiers. The Peking Government announced in a formal statement
that Russia had exceeded the provisions of the earlier treaties.
There exists a boundary question between China and the Soviet
Union not only because Czarist Russia annexed more than 1.5 mil-
lion square kilometers of Chinese territory by the unequal treaties it
imposed on China but also because in many places it crossed the
boundary lines stipulated by the unequal treaties and further occu-
pied vast expanses of Chinese teritory.34
B. Four Principal Treaties
There are four principal treaties dealing with the Sino-Soviet bor-
der: (1) the Treaty of Aigun35 in which the Russians obtained a large
area north of the Amur and west of the Sungari rivers; (2) the Treaty of
Peking36 by which the Russians annexed territory east of the Sungari
and Ussuri rivers; (3) the Tahcheng Protocol to the Treaty of Peking37
when Russia acquired additional territories in western China; (4) the
Treaty of St. Petersburg38 (sometimes referred to by the Chinese as the
Treaty of Ili) when China lost to Russia more territories near Ili.
According to Peking's calculations, these territories amount to
more than 1.5 million square kilometers. The breakdown is as follows:
600,000 square kilometers by the Aigun Treaty; 400,000 by the Peking
Treaty; 440,000 by the Tahcheng Protocol; and 70,000 by the St. Peters-
33. The speech was broadcast over Urumehi radio for a National Day rally in Urumchi,
34. Statement of the Government of the People's Republic or China,,May 24, 1969,
published by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking (1969). For details see text accompany-
ing notes 50 & 86-99 infra.
35. Aigun Treaty of Friendship and Boundaries, May 16-28, 1858, China-Russia I
TREATIES, CONVENTIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND FOREIGN STATES 81-82 (Shanghai, Statisti-
cal Department of the Inspectorate General of Customs Service, 2d ed. 1917) [hereinafter
cited as Treaty of Aigun].
36. Peking Additional Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Limits, Nov. 14, 1860,
China-Russia, reprinted in E. HERTSLET, I CHINA TREATIES 461-71 (1908) [hereinafter cited
as Treaty of Peking].
37. Tahcheng Protocol to the Treaty of Peking, Oct. 7, 1864, China-Russia, reprIntedin
E. HERTSLET, supra note 36, at 472-78 [hereinafter cited as Tahcheng Protocol].
38. Treaty of St. Petersburg, Feb. 24, 1881, China-Russia, reprinted in E. HERTSLET,
supra note 36, at 483-92 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of St. Petersburg].
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burg Treaty. These Chinese calculations of lost territories correspond
with those given by Pravda in its editorial of September 2, 1964,39 and
the statement of Mikhail Suslov.4
In addition, the Chinese Communists claimed another 2.6 million
square kilometers of territory now constituting the Soviet republics of
Kazakhstan, Kirighizia, Uzbekistan, and Tadzhikstan, as well as 1.44
million square kilometers which are now occupied by Outer Mongolia.
The total lost territory thus claimed by the Chinese would be 5.5 mil-
lion square kilometers, encompassing 20 million Soviet and Mongolian
residents.4'
The Chinese claims are serious. According to one observer, "the
Chinese give every evidence of a genuine ambition to recover the ac-
tual lands lost to Czarist Russia, or at least substantial portions." 42 At
one time, the Chinese Communists believed that the Russians might
return the lost territories as a comradely act.4 3 Theoretically, such be-
lief has an historical foundation. For example, Lenin was the first
Communist official who condemned the Czarist predatory taking of
Chinese lands as "a criminal policy" and charged the "European impe-
rialists," including Russia, with the deliberate partitioning of China. 4
His pronouncement implied a principle of restoration of lands seized
by the czars and national determination by subject peoples. This his-
torical foundation is also established in the declaration by Leo
Karakhan, Acting Commissar of Foreign Affairs, proclaiming that "all
secret treaties made before the revolution with China, Japan, or the
allies are hereby abrogated," and that "the Soviet government has re-
nounced the conquests made by the Czarist government which de-
prived China of Manchuria and other areas. . . . The Soviet
government abolishes all special privileges and gives up all factories
owned by Russian merchants on Chinese soil."45 Karakhan specifi-
cally renounced the Russian rights to the Chinese Eastern Railway and
Russia's share of the Boxer indemnity.46 He then proposed to enter
into negotiations with the Chinese Government on the abrogation of
the treaties and agreements disadvantageous to China and the return to
the Chinese people of everything that was taken from them by the
39. Pravda, Sept. 2, 1964, reprinted in DOOLIN, supra note 12, at 47-57.
40. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
41. H. SALISBURY, WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA 136 (1969).
42. Id. at 136-37.
43. Id. at 137.
44. Id.
45. See Karakhan Declarations, supra note 18, at 868-69.
46. Id. at 869.
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Czarist government independently or together with Japan or the al-
lies.4 7
The Karakhan declaration caused a tremendous stir in China and
promoted enormous good will toward the Soviets. His declaration was
the precipitating influence on Mao Tse-tung's decision to join the Chi-
nese Communist Party which was founded the following year, and it
was also one of the factors influencing Dr. Sun Yat-sen to lead the
Kuomintang to cooperate with the Chinese Communists.48 But when
the time came for actual negotiations in 1924, the Soviets did not relin-
quish any territorial rights, nor did they consider the border question
from the viewpoints advanced in the declaration. From 1919 to the
present day, the Soviets not only have not given up to China a single
square kilometer of territory taken by the Czars, but also they detached
Outer Mongolia from China and formally annexed the Tannu-Tuva
region between Sinkiang and Mongolia in 1944. The latter annexation
was kept secret until 1948.49 Since October 10, 1961, the Tannu-Tuva
region has been part of the Soviet Union known as the "Autonomous
Socialist Republic of Tuva."50 In addition, the Soviets retained their
special position in Manchuria up to 1955 and promoted the separatist
movement in Sinkiang even after the Chinese Communists had come
to power.
III. The 1969 Armed Clashes on the Ussuri
A. Background: The 1964 Negotiations
Before taking up the 1969 armed clashes, a brief account of the
problems involved in the 1964 negotiations between China and Russia
on the border disputes may be helpful. It is interesting to note that
both sides claimed that they had initiated the 1964 negotiations.51
47. TAO SHING CHANG, INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSIES OVER THE CHINESE EAST-
ERN RAILWAY 110-27 (1936).
48. See 0. CLUBB, CHINA AND RUSSIA: THE "GREAT GAME" 167, 230 (1971); see also
text of the Sun-Joffe Declaration issued in Shanghai in 1923, in [1924] CHINA YEARBOOK
863; A. WU, CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION 312-13 (1950).
49. The annexation was made public by Chiang Kai-shek. CHIANG KAI-SHEK, SOVIET
RUSSIA IN CHINA 98-99 (English ed. 1957). (Chinese edition appeared in 1952.)
50. INTERDOC, RUSSIA AND CHINA, A GUIDE TO THE SINO-SoVIET CONFLICT 40 (un-
dated pamphlet). For a detailed background, Sf P. TANG, RUSSIAN AND SOVIET POLICY IN
MANCHURIA AND OUTER MONGOLIA 399-425, 427-28 (1959); CHIANG KAI-SHEK, supra note
48.
51. For instance, the Chinese government in a statement of May 24, 1969, said, "As
early as August 22 and September 21, 1960, the Chinese Government twice took the initia-
tive in proposing to the Soviet Government that negotiations be held." Statement of the
[Vol. 3
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Since the negotiations were secret, it is still difficult to ascertain which
side really began the discussions. At any rate, the Soviet side was rep-
resented by Deputy Foreign Minister P. I. Zyryanov, and his Chinese
counterpart was Tseng Yung-chuan. They started meeting on Febru-
ary 25, 1964, in Peking and discussions terminated in September, 1968,
when the Russians called for a change of site to Moscow.
At these discussions, there were three main contentions. First, the
Chinese based their claim on ideology, asserting that all pre-1917 trea-
ties were unequal and hence invalid. In other words, the Chinese
presented a case of rebus sic stantibus, te., the old treaties become mdl
and void when conditions have changed. The Russians rejected this
view, claiming the continuing validity in international law of the old
treaties and pointing to the historical practice of the inhabitants of the
area. They stood for the principle ofpacta sunta servanda, te., treaties
remain valid unless altered by the parties concerned. In international
relations, law and practice diverge: in law, the decisions follow the
principle ofpacta sunt servanda, but in practice the exigencies of power
politics often allow the rebus sic stantibus principle to prevail.52
Second, the Chinese steadfastly upheld the principle of Thaiveg in
the river boundaries, L e., the dividing line of an international river fol-
lows the center of the main channel. According to this principle of
international law, most of the riverine islands would belong to China
and Soviet occupation of them would be illegal. But the Soviets re-
fused to accept this principle and offered maps and other "legal evi-
dence" to challenge the Chinese claim.
Third, there was a controversy concerning maps. The Chinese re-
jected the Soviets' map based on the Treaty of Peking of 1860.13 The
map was drawn at a scale of 1:1,000,000 which was far too small to be
used to determine ownership with accuracy. The Chinese submitted a
larger-scale map of the border to support their position.
The three major areas of contention which were addressed in the
1964 negotiations were not yet satisfactorily resolved when, on March
11, 1969, two incidents of bloodshed occurred at Chenpao Island
(which the Russians call Damansky Island). The Chinese Information
Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs54 issued a statement re-
capitulating China's position on the unequal treaties and accusing the
Government of the People's Republic of China, May 24, 1969, published by the Foreign
Languages Press, Peking (1969).
52. See H. BRIGHS, THE LAW OF NATONS 917-18 (2nd ed. 1952).
53. Treaty of Peking, supra note 35.
54. Waichiao pu is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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Soviet side of unreasonableness." The border situation became worse
along the Ussuri River in January, 1967, because of the severity of a
new set of river regulations promulgated by China in the previous
year.56 The river regulations introduced a discordant note into Sino-
Soviet relations but other sources of friction were apparent. The Rus-
sians also accused the Chinese of extremely provocative behavior in
connection with Cultural Revolution activities." The growing dishar-
mony between the two powers had set the stage for military activity
along the border.
B. Military Preparations
In the years from 1950 to 1960, Russia surpassed China in weap-
onry and military logistics support. The disparity in military prepared-
ness was of little concern because of the friendly relations between
China and Russia. But by the early 1960's, the Chinese kept 14 infan-
try divisions in Manchuria, five divisions in Inner Mongolia, and five
more in Sinkiang.58 In addition, the Chinese stationed border guards
equivalent in number to two to three divisions and supplemented them
with the Production and Construction Corps in Sinkiang and in Inner
Mongolia.59 Altogether, the supplemental divisions would constitute
between 420,000 and 450,000 men. The Soviet border personnel num-
bered 20 to 24 divisions, or between 250,000 and 300,000 men.6" De-
spite fewer men and long lines of communication, the Soviets enjoyed a
more favorable logistical posture as well as better equipment with the
result that the border strength of both sides was in a rough balance.
In 1966, the Soviets not only transferred their highly trained forces
from Eastern Europe to the Far East, but also stationed strong military
units in Outer Mongolia after the renewal of the 20-year defense pact
55. Published originally in Jen-Min Jih-Pao, Mar. 11, 1969. In addition, an editorial,
Down with the New Tsars, was published on March 4 in Jen-Min Jih-Pao, reported in New
York Times, May 24, 1969, at 19-25. The statement refused to recognize the treaties as the
basis for settling the boundary question between the two countries in its vain attempt to
force China to accept a new unequal treaty, and thus to perpetuate in legal form its occupa-
tion of the Chinese territory which it seized by crossing the boundary line defined by the
unequal treaties. The Chinese side clearly pointed out that if the Soviet side should obdu-
rately insist on such a stand and inexorably refuse to mend its ways, the Chinese side would
have to reconsider its position as regards the Sino-Soviet boundary question as a whole.
56. The 1966 regulations were published in New China News Agency, Apr. 19, 1966.
57. T. ROBINSON, THE SINO-SoviET BORDER DiSPUTE 19 (1970).
58. N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1966, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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with the Ulan Bator government in January of that year.61 By Novem-
ber 1967, the Soviets had even established missile bases on Mongolian
soil.62 In the following summer, the Soviets were able to stage their
first series of large scale military maneuvers in the Mongolian area.
Observers reported that there were six divisions of Russian troops, in-
cluding one tank division.63 By 1969, this number had reportedly
reached 8 to 10 divisions. '
When the Soviets moved their troops and equipment close to the
Sino-Mongolian border, the balance of power between the Chinese and
Soviet forces was upset. Although the Chinese moved additional forces
and equipment to Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, the maneuver was
not enough to offset the Soviet buildup. Chinese manpower resources
were severely limited because the army was heavily engaged in the
complex responsibilities of the Cultural Revolution during this pe-
riod.6" Geographically, the Soviet forces were close to Peking, espe-
cially when measured from the Chinese border city of Ehrlieng, Inner
Mongolia, rather than from Harbin, Manchuria.
C. The Chenpao Island Armed Conflict
Despite the tension on the Mongolian border, the armed conflict
which occurred in 1969 erupted at Chenpao Island and not the
Mongolian border because of longstanding disputes over river bounda-
ries. Chenpao Island is located at 133' 51' E longitude and 40* 51' N
latitude on the Ussuri River, which forms the boundary between Rus-
sia and China in accordance with the Treaty of Peking of 1860.66 The
nearest Russian settlement is Nizhne Mikhailovsky and the nearest
Chinese village is Kung-szu. As the main channel of the Ussuri River
passes to the east of the island, the Chinese claim ownership in line
with the Thalweg principle of international law. The island and chan-
nel have been described by one authority as uninhabited and distinctly
uninviting.
From the location of navigation markers on the two shores and the
curvature of the river, it would appear that ships traverse the eastern
channel. The island itself is, by testimony of both sides, uninhabited,
although Chinese fishermen apparently use it for drying their nets,
61. N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1966, at 4, col. 7.
62. N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1968, at 5, coL 1.
63. L.A. Times, July 10, 1968, § 1, at 22, coL 5.
64. N.Y. Times, May 24, 1969, at 3, coL 1.
65. Le Monde, Apr. 13-14, 1969, at 2, coL 5.
66. Treaty of Peking, supra note 36.
No. 2]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
and both nationalities may do some logging on it. It is about one
mile in length, about one-third mile wide, and is flooded during the
spring thaw.
6 7
An apparent lack of attractive attributes notwithstanding,
Chenpao Island was the site where the Chinese and Russians fought
two battles on March 2 and March 15, 1969. The first battle was actu-
ally a two-hour skirmish which allegedly resulted in more than 30 So-
viet border guards and a number of Chinese soldiers being killed or
wounded.68 The second military engagement was a regular battle, in-
volving much larger forces, higher losses, and lasted much longer-
nine hours.69
Although each side accused the other of initiating military action,
at least one disinterested observer noted that the first skirmish could
have been initiated accidentally by the Chinese in response to the intru-
sion of the Soviet guards, but that the second was begun by the Rus-
sians for the purpose of pressuring the Chinese to negotiate a
settlement of the border issue.70
These military actions were the first such incidents between the
two Communist giants. Upon learning that the Soviet Government
had sent China a note of protest because of the March 2, 1969, incident,
Jen-Min Jih-Pao7" and Jiefangjun Pao72 expressed the opinion that the
Russians had provoked the attack. The Chinese editorial cited the 1860
Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking7 3 in defense of the Chinese position.
The Treaty contained a relevant provision which stipulated that from
the estuary of the Ussuri River southward to Hsingkai Lake, the
boundary line shall be along the Ussuri and Sungacha Rivers. Land
lying east of these rivers belongs to Russia and the land west of these
rivers belongs to China."
67. ROBINSON, supra note 57.
68. Le Monde, Mar. 15, 1969, at 4, col. 4; Le Monde, Mar. 16-17, 1969, at 1, col. 3; Le
Monde, Mar. 18, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
69. Newspaper sources indicated that the Russians lost 60 men and the Chinese 800,
According to one observer, however, the breakdown between dead and wounded was not
clear in the statistics provided by either side. It could be presumed then that the Chinese
figure, even if accurate, likely represented both dead and wounded. Id.
70. Id.
71. Joint Statement, supra note 22.
72. Down with the New Tsars, supra note 55.
73. Treaty of Peking, supra note 36.
74. Article I of the Treaty of Peking. Text reprinted in E. HERTSLErr, supra note 35.
"Henceforth the eastern frontier between the two empires shall commence from the juncture
of the rivers Shika and Argun, will follow the course of the River Amur to junction of the
River Ussuri with the latter. The land on the left bank (to the north) of the River Amur
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The Information Department of the Peking Waichiao pu further
amplified its editorial stand with a statement of applicable interna-
tional law on river boundaries.
According to established principles of international law, in the
case of navigable boundary rivers, the central line of the main chan-
nel shall form the boundary line which determines the ownership of
islands. Chenpao Island and the nearby Kapotzu and Chilichin Is-
lands are all situated on the Chinese side of the central line of the
main channel of the Ussuri River and have always been under
China's jurisdiction. Chinese frontier guards have always patrolled
these islands and Chinese inhabitants have always carried on pro-
duction on these islands. During the Sino-Soviet boundary negotia-
tions in 1964, the Soviet itself could not but admit that these islands
are Chinese territory.75
On the day of the second military action,76 the Waichiao pu sent a note
to the Soviet Embassy in Peking charging that a large number of Soviet
forces accompanied by armored cars and tanks had intruded on
Chenpao and the Chinese waterway to the west of the island. Accord-
ing to the note, the Chinese frontier guards had been compelled to fight
back. The Soviets sent reinforcements and then "opened artillery fire
on areas deep within Chinese territory."77 The note concluded with a
warning: "The Soviet government must be held fully responsible for
all the grave consequences arising therefrom." 78
In Moscow, the Soviet Government also protested on the very day
of the clash to the Chinese Embassy, accusing the Chinese authorities
of "new and impudent provocation. '79 The statement also contained a
warning, "If new attempts are made to violate the integrity of Soviet
territory, the Soviet Union and all of its peoples will defend it reso-
lutely and will oppose a crushing riposte to such violations. ' It was
reported that the Chinese Charg6 refused to accept the message but he
must certainly have wired its contents to his government.8'
On March 29, 1969, the Soviet Government issued a statement re-
garding Sino-Soviet relations in general and the boundary question in
belongs to the Empire of Russia, and the territory on the right bank (to the south) to the
junction of the River Ussuri to Empire of China... " Id.
75. Down with the New Tsars, supra note 55.
76. March 15, 1969.
77. Down with the New Tsars, supra note 55.
78. Id.
79. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1969, at 16, col. 1.
80. Id. at 16, col 2.
81. 0. CLUBB, supra note 48, at 501; N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1969, at 1, col. 2.
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particular.82 As to the Ussuri boundary, the communiqu6 stated: "In
1861, the two sides signed a map on which the frontier line in the Us-
suri region was traced. Near Damansky island, that line passed di-
rectly along the Chinese shore of the River. The originals of those
documents are held by the Chinese Government as well as by that of
the USSR."83 The statement asserted that the Chinese Government
had signified its acceptance of the existing frontiers by concluding an
agreement on shipping on the Amur and the Ussuri in 1951 and by
obtaining permission from the Soviet authorities to use certain islands
in these rivers for logging and hay-making. The Soviets denied that the
nineteenth century treaties were unequal but proposed the resumption
of 1964 border "consultations" as soon as possible.84
IV. Points of Dispute and the Protracted Negotiations in
Peking
The Soviet Government formally proposed to hold "consulta-
tions" on the boundary issue by inviting China to send a delegation to
Moscow within four days.85 Contrary to the usual diplomatic practice,
the Soviets made public their note on April 12, 1969, without waiting
for a reply from the Chinese Government. 6 The Soviets rebuked the
Chinese Government for employing every possible means to conceal
from the Chinese people the contents of the statement of March 29th,
1969. In response, the Chinese Government issued a long statement on
May 24, 1969, concerning its position on ihe boundary question and
simultaneously published in full the text of the Soviet statement.8 7
The Soviet statement of March 29, 1969, and the Chinese state-
ment of May 24, 1969, are very important documents in the boundary
dispute88 because they set forth the positions and points of dispute of
both sides. Analysis of these two statements indicates that the principal
82. Text of Soviet statement broadcast by Tass, Mar. 29, 1969, reprinted in Le Monde,
Apr. 1, 1969, at 4, cols. 1-6.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Note of Hsinhua on Statement of Soviet Government of March 29, HSINIIUA SE-
LECTED NEws ITEMS, June 2, 1969, at 8 (20 New China News Agency 8) [hereinafter cited as
HsINHUA].
86. Id.
87. Id. at 3-8. The New China News Agency added a note challenging the Soviets with
these words: "Here we would like to ask the Soviet Government to do the same and publish
in full the text of the statement of the Chinese Government in the Soviet press." Id. at 8, To
this author's knowledge, the Soviets did not do so. See also CHI HSiNc, CH-NPAO TAO
SHIH-CHIEN CHEN-HsING (A TRUE STORY OF THE CHENPAO ISLAND INCIDENT) 59 (1969),
88. HSINHUA, supra note 85 at 3-8.
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problems involved in the dispute are: (1) the question of river borders,
(2) the possibility that present Sino-Soviet treaties are unequal treaties,
(3) the issue of whether there is a valid boundary problem, and (4)
which country violated the status quo of the boundary.
First, according to the Treaty of Peking of 1860,89 should the Sino-
Soviet boundary be the center of the main channel of the Ussuri River
or should the boundary be along the Chinese bank of the Ussuri River?
The Treaty itself only stipulated that the Ussuri River should form part
of the boundary between China and Russia. The Chinese interpreta-
tion follows the established principle of international law that in the
case of navigable boundary rivers, the central line of the main channel
shall form the boundary line and determine the ownership of islands
therein.9" Chenpao Island is situated on the Chinese side of the central
line of the main channel of the Ussuri River, and the Chinese assert
that the island "indisputably belongs to China and has always been
under China's jurisdiction."'"
The Soviet Government invoked the map attached to the Peking
Treaty92 to support their view that in the area of Chenpao Island the
demarcation line shown "passes directly along the Chinese bank of the
Ussuri River" 93 and therefore the island in dispute should belong to
Russia. The Chinese noted that the map was drawn unilaterally by
Czarist Russia before the boundary was surveyed in 1861.
[I]n 1961, China and Russia surveyed and marked only the land
boundary south of the Hsingkai Lake but not the river boundary on
the Wusuli [i.e., Ussuri] and Heilung [Amur] rivers, and a red line
was drawn on the attached map on a scale smaller than 1:1,000,000
only to indicate that the two rivers form the boundary between the
two countries. The red line on this attached map does not, and can-
not possible, show the precise location of the boundary line in the
rivers, still less is it intended to determine the ownership of islands.
94
The Chinese cited three factors in support of their position. (a)
On May 8, 1908, the Russian Commissar of the Amur Region wrote to
a Chinese official that if countries are divided by a river, then the line
running along the middle of the river should be taken as the boundary
line between them: on navigable rivers, this line should be drawn
89. Treaty of Peking, supra note 36.
90. See G. VON GLANN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 303 (1976).
91. HSINHUA, supra note 85, at 4.
92. Treaty of Peking, supra note 36.
93. Id.
94. HSINHUA, supra note 85, at 4.
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along the channel. 95 Later the same year, he wrote: "Islands in the
rivers are divided by the river channel."96 (b) During the Sino-Soviet
boundary negotiations in 1964, the Soviet representative "could not but
agree that the central line of the main channel should be taken for de-
termining the boundary line on the rivers and the ownership of is-
lands."97 (c) Chenpao was originally not an island, but a part of the
bank on the side of the Ussuri River. It later became an island as a
result of erosion by the river water. "To this day, Chenpao Island still
connects with the Chinese bank at low water, and the river-arm to the
west of the Island has never become a waterway." 98
To dispute Chinese claims, a Soviet note of June 15, 1969,99
pointed out that the protocol on the exchange of maps was signed in
1863 by the representatives of both countries and that a red line on the
map showing the Sino-Soviet border runs directly along the Chinese
bank of the river in the vicinity of Chenpao (or Damansky in the Rus-
sian note). The Soviet note then proceeded to challenge the applicabil-
ity of the Thalweg principle in this dispute:
It is common knowledge that in international law there is no norm
that automatically establishes the border line on frontier rivers as
running along the middle of the river's main channel. In concluding
treaties involving such situations, states mark the border in the way
that they believe most suitable and in accordance with the circum-
stances. There are examples in interstate relations in which a border
has been established along the bank of a river, not along its channel.
The 1858 treaty between Costa Rica and Nicaragua stipulates that
the border line runs along the right bank of the San Juan River, and
that 'the Republic of Nicaragua has the exclusive right of possession
and sovereign jurisdiction with respect to the waters of this river.'
• ..The 1860 Russo-Chinese Treaty of Peking is another such exam-
ple. °°
One day after it had agreed to resume negotiations with the Soviet
representative in Peking, the Chinese Government issued another state-
ment refuting the Soviet position:
The attached map is on a scale smaller than 1:1,000,000. The red line
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Note from the Soviet Government to the Peking Government dated June 15, 1969,
reprinted in Soviet Note on Border Conflict with China 21 (No. 24) CURRENT DIGEST OF THE
SOVIET PRESS 9 (July 9, 1969).
100. Id. at 11.
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on it only indicates that the rivers form the boundary; it does not,
and cannot possibly, show the precise location of the boundary lines
in the rivers. In order to deny the principle of international law that
the central line of the main channel shall form the boundary line in
the case of navigable boundary rivers, the Soviet Government cited
as an example the treaty concluded between Costa Rica and Nicara-
gua in 1858 . . .moreover, it imprudently alleged that the "Sino-
Russian Treaty of Peking" was likewise a case in point. Of course,
there are exceptions to any established principle of international law,
and the same is true of the principle that the central line of the main
channel shall form the boundary in the case of navigable boundary
rivers. But explicit stipulations must be made in treaties for any ex-
ceptional case. Articles II and VI of the 1858 boundary treaty be-
tween Costa Rica and Nicaragua do contain such stipulations. Now
we want to ask the Soviet Government: Where is it stipulated in the
"Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking" that the boundary line between
China and Russia runs along the Chinese bank of the Heilung
[Amur] and Wusuli [Ussuri] rivers? And where is it stipulated that
Czarist Russia "enjoys exclusive right of possession and sovereign
jurisdiction" over the Heilung and Wusuli Rivers?' 0 '
The merit of the Chinese argument that it is impossible to denote a
boundary along a river bank using a map on a scale smaller than
1:1,000,000 is a legal problem of interpretation of treaties. The issue
might well be resolved by third-party arbitration or by adjudication of
the International Court of Justice.
Second, are the existing treaties relating to the present Sino-Soviet
boundary unequal treaties? The Soviet statement insisted that the cur-
rent Russian-Chinese boundary in the Far East had been shaped "as a
result of historical processes" over a long period. 0 2 This boundary had
been legally stipulated through the Treaties of Aigun, 0 3 Tientsin,"°
and Peking, 05 and the Soviet Government considered those treaties
which delimited boundaries as not being unequal treaties. While the
Bolshevik Government led by Lenin espoused the principle of annul-
ment of unequal treaties concluded by the Czarist Government with
China, the present Government rejected the principle in stating that
101. Statement of Oct. 8, 1969, in 12 PEKING REvIEW 14-15 (1969).
102. Soviet statement of March 29, 1969, supra note 82.
103. Treaty of Aigun, supra note 35.
104. Treaty of Tientsin, June 13, 1858, China-Russia. The treaty dealt primarily with
trade rights and routes, but Article 9 indicated that undefined sections of the boundary be-
tween the two nations would be investigated "without delay." English text in 0. CLUDD,
supra note 81, at 85-86.
105. Treaty of Peking, supra note 36.
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unequal treaties "did not include the treaties for defining the bounda-
ries between the two countries. . . there is no question as to their an-
nulment or revision."'' 0 6
China advanced the argument that Czarist Russia, a European
country, was originally not contiguous to China. In the 16th century,
Russia began to expand eastward, and not until the latter half of the
17th century did the question of a boundary with China arise. In 1689,
both countries concluded the first boundary treaty' 07 which defined the
eastern sector of the Sino-Russian boundary. In 1727, both countries
concluded another treaty'0 8 delimiting the middle sector of the bound-
ary which now forms the Mongolian-Soviet boundary. As for the west-
ern frontier of China, "it was then at the Balkhash Lake, a great
distance from the boundary of Czarist Russia."'0 9
The Chinese regarded the treaties signed by China with Russia in
the second half of the 19th century as the result of Czarist collusion
with Western countries pursuing an aggressive expansionist policy.'" 0
To the Chinese Communist regime, it appeared that within the short
space of half a century the Czarist Government had forced China to
sign a series of unequal treaties, by which Russia annexed more than
1.5 million square kilometers of Chinese territory."' Vast areas were
lost to China in the Manchurian area by the Treaty of Aigun"1 2 (ac-
count for 600,000 square kilometers) and the Treaty of Peking" 13
(400,000 square kilometers). In the Sinkiang area, territory was lost
through the Protocol' '4 of 1864 (440,000 square kilometers) and the
Treaty of St. Petersburg of 1881' 1 (70,000 square kilometers).
The Chinese also pointed out that all of these treaties were de-
clared "null and void" by Lenin on September 27, 1920.' 16 Lenin's
declaration stated that the Soviet Government "declares null and void
all the treaties concluded with China by the former Governments of
106. Soviet Statement of Mar. 29, 1969, supra note 82.
107. Nerchinsk Treaty of Peace and Boundaries, Aug. 27, 1689, China-Russia, reprinted
in E. HERTSLET, II TREATIES BETWEEN CHINA AND FOREIGN POWERS 437-38 (1908).
108. Burisky Treaty (sometimes referred to as Bur Treaty), Aug. 20, 1729, China-Russia.
Partial English text of Boundary Protocol in TAI-SUNo AN, THE SINO-SovIET TERRITORIAL
DISPUTE 171-78 (1973).
109. Soviet statement of Mar. 29, 1969, supra note 82.
110. Id.
I11. Id.
112. Treaty of Aigun, supra note 35.
113. Treaty of Peking, supra note 36.
114. Tahcheng Protocol, supra note 37.
115. Treaty of St. Petersburg, supra note 38.
116. Soviet statement of Mar. 29, 1969, supra note 82.
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Russia, renounces all seizure of Chinese territory, and all Russian con-
cessions [emphasis supplied] in China, without any compensation and
forever, all that had been predatorily seized from her by the Czar's
Government and the Russian Bourgeoisie.""' 7 Furthermore, by the
1924 Agreement with China, "8 the Soviet Government agreed to annul
all conventions, treaties, agreements, protocols and contracts concluded
between the government of China and the Czarist Government and to
replace them with instruments based on equality, reciprocity and jus-
tice. Such new agreements would be in harmony will the spirit of the
Declarations of the Soviet Government of the years of 1919 and 1920 to
re-demarcate their national boundaries.' 19
The Russian Government objected to the Chinese argument and
reiterated that the 19th century treaties were "equal" treaties signed by
representatives of both governments and "should retain their force as
inter-state documents of both countries up to the present time."' 2 0
With regard to the Soviet renunciation of "unequal" treaties following
the Bolshevik Revolution, the Russian Government of 1969 argued
that renunciation involved only such treaty rights as extraterritoriality
and spheres of influence. Furthermore, since the Soviet declarations of
191921 and 192012 and the Sino-Soviet agreement of 192411 did not
indicate that the treaties defining the location of the present Sino-So-
viet border were included among the unequal or secret treaties, there
could be no discussion of their abrogation or revision.
The Chinese view does not maintain that all treaties imposed on
China in the past are unequal and therefore illegal and void. The Pe-
king Government has not taken unilateral action to denounce the trea-
ties in question because of their "inequality." What Peking has insisted
on is that the Soviets must admit that the treaties are "unequal" and
that new "equal" treaties should be negotiated in their stead. Although
the Peking Government has not directly invoked the doctrine of rebus
sic stantibus, their attitude and actions conform with that principle of
117. Id.
118. Agreement on Principles for the Settlement of the Questions Between the Republic
of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, May 31, 1924. This agreement con-
sists of an Agreement on General Principles, an Agreement for the Provisional Management
of the Chinese Eastern Railway, seven declarations and an exchange of notes. English text
in 37 L.N.T.S. 176 (1925). See also TAo SHING CHANG, supra note 46, at 119-27.
119. Soviet Statement of Mar. 29, 1969, supra note 81.
120. Soviet Note on Border Conflict with China, supra note 98, at 10.
121. The Declaration of 1919, China-U.S.S.R. [1924] CHINA YEARBOOK 868-70.
122. The Declaration of 1920, China-U.S.S.R. [1924] CHINA YEARBOOK 870-72.
123. Agreement on Principles for the Settlement of the Questions Between the Republic
of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, supra note 118.
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international law. In spite of the divergent opinions on the application
of this doctrine, international lawyers generally agree that a fundamen-
tal change of circumstances can be a legitimate reason for demanding
the revision or termination of a treaty and that a party invoking the
doctrine should seek release from treaty obligations through diplomatic
negotiations and not through unilateral denunciation. 24
The Russian Government has refused to recognize the "unequal"
nature of these boundary treaties for fear of putting themselves in an
untenable legal position which might allow the Chinese to ask for more
concessions on the entire frontier in the future. And perhaps other
countries with contiguous borders such as Finland, Rumania or Poland
might apply the same principles to other border questions.
Third, is there a boundary question between China and the Soviet
Union? The March 29 Soviet statement pointed out that the 1924
Agreement did not consider the boundary treaties "as being among the
unequal treaties" and that "there was no talk of their being an-
nulled."' 25 The May 24 Chinese statement characterized the Soviet as-
sertion as "juggling with history, adapting it to its territorial claims."'' 26
In fact, China and the Soviet Union, in pursuance of the 1924 Agree-
ment, had held talks in 1926127 to discuss the re-damarcation of the
boundary and the conclusion of a new treaty, but no new agreement
was reached. 128
The Chinese statement further asserted: "There exists a boundary
question between China and the Soviet Union not only because Czarist
Russia annexed more than 1.5 million square kilometers of Chinese
territory by the unequal treaties it imposed on China, but also because
it crossed in many places the boundary line stipulated by the unequal
treaties and further occupied vast expanses of Chinese territory.' 29
The statement pointed out two examples. In the Pamir area, Czarist
Russia occupied more than 20,000 square kilometers of Chinese terri-
124. See H. BRIOGS, supra note 52, at 917-18. In regard to border disputes, it should be
noted that Article 62 of the 1969 Convention on the Law of Treaties specifically excludes the
application of the doctrine, rebus sic stantibus, to treaties establishing boundaries. Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 702 (1969). The PRC
is not a signatory to the convention and has not yet acceded to it.
125. Soviet Statement of Mar. 29, 1969, supra note 82.
126. HSINHUA, supra note 85, at 6.
127. Id. (Talks at Peking, 1926).
128. The Chinese statement of May 24, 1969, pointed out that "owing to the historical
conditions at the time, no agreement was reached by the two sides on the boundary question,
no re-demarcation of the boundary between the two countries was made and no new equal
treaty was concluded by the two countries." HSINHUA, supra note 85, at 6.
129. Id. at 5.
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tory in violation of the "Protocol on Sino-Russian Boundary in the
Kashgar Region" of 1884. In the Ussuri and Amur rivers sector, the
Soviet Government, in violation of the Treaty of Aigun and the Treaty
of Peking as well as the established principles of international law, had
gone so far "as to draw the boundary line almost entirely along the
Chinese bank and in some places even on China's inland rivers and
islands, marking as Soviet territory over 600 of the 700 and more Chi-
nese islands on the Chinese side of the central line of the main channel,
which covers an area of more than 11,000 square kilometers."' 30 Fi-
nally, the Chinese statement said that the mere concluding of the
"Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assist-
ance"' 31 did not signify the settlement of the boundary question or the
non-existence of a boundary question between the two countries.
Fourth, who initially violated the status quo of the boundary?
This issue is hotly debated by both parties. The Chinese accused the
Soviets of incessant violations of the boundary status quo by pushing
Soviet patrol routes into Chinese territory, building military installa-
tions within Chinese territory, assaulting or kidnapping Chinese border
inhabitants, sabotaging Chinese production and carrying out provoca-
tive and subversive activities. 32
For their part, the Soviet Government accused the Chinese Gov-
ernment of pursuing a policy of expansion. 33 Russia claimed that
China was not on good terms with neighboring countries because of
claims against their territories. The Chinese response to the accusation
pointed out that "the whole world knows that since the founding of the
People's Republic of China, the Chinese Government has satisfactorily
settled complicated boundary questions left over by history and con-
cluded boundary treaties with neighboring countries such as Burma,
Nepal, Pakistan, Mongolia, and Afghanistan, with the exception of the
Soviet Union and India."'134
These four principal controversial points in the Chinese and Rus-
sian statements represented the bases for disagreement between the two
powers. For resolution of the disagreement, the Russians suggested
"consultations" and "clarification on individual sectors of the Soviet-
130. Id.
131. Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, supra note 3.
132. HsINHUA, supra note 85, at 6. "From October 15, 1964, to March 15 this year, the
Soviet side provoked as many as 4,189 border incidents, two and one-half times the number
of those it provoked from 1960 to 1964, with its tactics getting even more vicious and its
behavior even more unbridled." Id.
133. Soviet statement of Mar. 29, 1969, upra note 82.
134. HsINHUA, supra note 85.
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Chinese state border line."'' 35 The Chinese Government urged peace-
ful negotiations for the overall settlement of the boundary question and
"the conclusion of a new equal treaty to replace the old unequal
ones."'136 The Chinese at this time still insisted on Soviet admission of
the "unequal nature of the 19th century border treaties as a condition
for entering negotiations."'1
37
In the midst of a steady stream of border incidents, the relations
between the two countries were so tense that, following a new clash at
Pacha (which the Russians call Goldinski) Island of Fuyuan District in
Heilungkiang Province on July 8, 1969, a Soviet journalist hinted that
the Russians might launch a preemptive attack on China.13 1 Western
journalists also expressed concern over the deteriorating Sino-Soviet
relationship. 139
On October 7, 1969, the Peking Government in a formal statement
announced that China had agreed with the Soviet Union to hold nego-
tiations on their border disputes, adding: "There is no reason whatso-
ever for China and the Soviet Union to fight a war over the boundary
question."' 40 The statement also disclosed that Chou En-lai had pro-
posed to Kosygin, when they met at the Peking airport, that the two
sides should first reach an agreement on the provisional measures for
maintaining the status quo of the border, for averting armed conflicts,
and for disengagement.' 4 ' The Chinese side further proposed that the
armed forces of the Chinese and Soviet sides disengage by withdrawing
from, or refraining from entering, all the disputed areas along the Sino-
Soviet border.'42
135. Soviet Statement of Mar. 29, 1969, supra note 82.
136. HSINHUA, supra note 85, at 8.
137. T. ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 73.
138. N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1969, at 5, col. 3.
139. N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1969, at 1, col. 8; N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1969, at 12, col. 2. The
New York Times also expressed "fear" of a Moscow-Peking conflict. In its September 1,
1969, editorial it stated that, incredibly, the Kremlin could be seriously considering a pre-
ventive war against China or even an aerial strike at Chinese nuclear facilities. Yet little
more than a year earlier it had seemed equally incredible that Soviet troops would invade
Czechoslovakia. The editorial concluded: "A decision to strike at China would be the most
disastrous miscalculation of all, yet, tragically, there can be no guarantee this decision will
not be taken." N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1969, at 16, col. 1.
140. Document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 47
(Oct. 8, 1964). This document and the statement of Oct. 7, 1969, are published separately by
the Foreign Languages Press, Peking (1969).
141. Id.
142. Id. The disputed areas were those where the two sides disagreed in their delinea-
tions of the boundary line on the maps exchanged during the 1964 Sino-Soviet boundary
negotiations.
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Moreover this October 7 statement announced two important prin-
ciples. First, the Chinese Government had never demanded the return
of the territory Czarist Russia had annexed by means of the unequal
treaties.'43 China officially defined her position, abandoning claims to
1.5 million square kilometers of China's "lost territories." The note
pointed out that it was the Soviet Government which "has persisted in
occupying still more Chinese territory in violation of the stipulations of
these treaties, and moreover, peremptorily demanded that the Chinese
Government recognize such occupation as legal."'" Second, as the So-
viets had insinuated that China intended to launch a nuclear war
against the Soviet Union, the statement added: "China develops nu-
clear weapons for defense and for breaking the nuclear monopoly...
at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use
nuclear weapons. . . . but at the same time China will never be intimi-
dated by war threats, including nuclear war threats."' 45
Thus, the Peking Government clarified its position in regard to its
territorial claims against Russia. China did not demand the return of
territory that Czarist Russia annexed in Siberia and Central Asia dur-
ing the 19th century under "unequal treaties." To effect such a return
would require the conclusion of a new equal treaty to replace the old
unequal Sino-Russian treaties, new boundary surveys and the erection
of boundary markers. 4 '
The Soviet Government sent First Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily
V. Kuznetsov to Peking, where he met with his Chinese counterpart,
Chiao Kuan-hua 47 The result of the meeting was expressed in a later
statement by party leader Brezhnev 48 that the Soviet Union was in
favor of a solution of frontier and other problems with China on a
lasting and just basis in a spirit of equality, mutual respect and consid-
eration of the interests of both countries. 49
Up to December of 1969, there were neither more skirmishes nor
polemical attacks. But there were reports of border buildups in Peking
143. Id.
144- Id.
145. Id.
146. "Any side which occupies the territory of the other side in violation of these treaties
must, in principle, return it unconditionally to the other side, but necessary adjustment of
the areas concerned on the border may be made." Id.
147. Meeting of Oct. 20, 1969, at Peking, reported in N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1969, at 1, col.
6.
148. Brezhnev was then the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party.
149. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1969, at 1, col 6. Statement by L. Brezhnev, "If the Chinese
side also shows good will, then this will be possible." Id.
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and in the interior of China where the Chinese had begun construction
of air raid shelters.150
By mid-December, Kuznetsov and his deputy' 5' left China for
Moscow for consultation because the negotiations were stalemated.
Later, the Soviet chief delegate said in Moscow that the two sides were
merely reiterating their positions and had not come to grips with an
agreed agenda.' 52
Nonetheless, the negotiations were resumed upon the return of
Kuznetsov to Peking in mid-January, 1970. Kuznetsov reported that
the Soviet Union was willing to make minor concessions if the Chinese
would renounce claims to the entire Soviet Far East, which the Chinese
had charged was taken from China through "unequal treaties" in the
19th century. Peking refused to talk about the border until the Soviets
agreed to a mutual withdrawal of troops to a distance of about sixty
miles and to a renunciation of the use of force to settle the disputes.
The Soviets refused the requests, insisting that negotiations must be
conducted without preconditions. 53 There followed more exchanges
of polemical blasts between Moscow and Peking, and border tension
was again heightened. 54
The Chinese and Russian Communists are strange bedfellows. On
July 2, 1970, Peking agreed to accept a new Soviet ambassador, Vladi-
mir I. Stepakov, who was unable to assume his position because of poor
health. 155 At the same time, First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov,
also ailing, reportedly returned to Moscow.' 5 6 On August 15, a new
Soviet negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid F. Ilyichev, arrived
in Peking for continuing talks.'57 Despite these diplomatic moves,
150. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1969, at 14, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1969, at 3, col. 1.
15 1. Major General Vadim A. Matrosov, chief of staff of the Soviet border troops,
152. N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1969, at col. 7; N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1969, at 1, col. 4.
153. N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1970, at 3, col. 1.
154. The Chinese received a thinly veiled warning from Pravda. An author writing
under the pseudonym of J. Alexandrov wrote on China. An earlier article by Alexandrov
had painted a bloodcurdling picture of the anti-communist riot in Prague paving the way for
the Soviet army occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The present article depicted the
Chinese Government as deliberately provoking anti-Soviet sentiments, trying to use pres-
sure tactics on Moscow's delegation in the current Sino-Soviet negotiations in Peking, and
cooperating with the United States in aiding the imperialists to split world communism. The
author's pseudonym was a clear signal to Mao to remember the fate of Czechoslovakia and
the inherent meaning of the Brezhnev Doctrine if Mao's government remained stubbornly
defiant. N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1970, at 42, col. 1.
155. N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1970, at 3, col. 2.
156. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1970, at 17, col. I.
157. Id.
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Chou En-lai still saw China in peril.'5 8
Two events in 1971 provoked a statement from the Soviet press
that China had fabricated the Russian invasion. 5 9 In May, the Chi-
nese had tested an ICBM and, in July, President Nixon had announced
a projected visit to Peking. Despite the distrust evidenced by both the
Soviets and the Chinese, the two sides made further moves to ease ten-
sion by concluding a new trade pact in Moscow on August 5, 1971,
calling for a tripling of the current trade volume, and the stationing of
ambassadors in each other's capitals.16 The new Soviet envoy, Vasily
S. Tolstikov, arrived in Peking in Mid-October 1971. Thus, what the
Communists called "state to state" relations were back to normal sta-
tus. In May 1972, after Nixon had visited China, the Soviet negotiating
team in Peking was reportedly allowed to travel to see the country, 61
and Sino-Soviet relations seemed somewhat less strained, yet very fluid
and unpredictable.
V. The Most Recent Developments
The Sino-Soviet territorial dispute is not an isolated issue in the
world political scene. Since the Nixon visit to China in February 1972,
which opened the door for normal relations between China and the
United States in accordance with the Shanghai communiqu6 of Febru-
ary 27, 1972,162 the world power structure has been realigned greatly.
Militarily Russia is far stronger than China. However, in the event of a
Sino-Soviet military conflict, Russia would have to consider the role
that the United States might play. Although both China and Russia
have accused each other of war-mongering, their relations have not
been worsening since 1969 and, on occasion, the two powers have even
attempted reconciliations. The border-river agreement of 1977,63 is
158. N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1970, at 11, coL 1. In an interview on December 11 with
Edgar Snow, an American journalist, he said: "in the north and in the west is the Soviet
Union with a million men and missile forces, and in the east, the United States allied with
Japan which is feverishly rearming." Id.
159. N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1971, at 2.
160. N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1969, at 1, coL 8; N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1969, at 12, col. 2.
However, following the sudden visit to China of Alexci Kosygin who talked with Chou En-
lai at the Peking airport on September 11, both sides agreed to have full-scale negotiations
on the boundary question in October 1969 in Peking. Later, the news dispatches disclosed
that Kosygin also proposed to discuss the resumption of trade talks, reinstatement of ambas-
sadors in Moscow and Peking, and an accord allowing Soviet planes to fly through China to
Hanoi.
161. Sing-Tao Jih-Pao, May 27, 1972, at 1.
162. Reprinted in 15 (No. 9) PEKING REViEW 4-5 (1972).
163. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1977, at 8, col. 3.
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one of the examples. Nonetheless, there is no indication of a major
breakthrough in the boundary negotiations question.
A brief analysis of the most recent developments indicates that
there are four areas of concern: (1) deadlocked negotiations on bound-
ary problems, (2) no acceptance of a non-aggression pact proposal, (3)
the possibility of fruitful negotiations on riverine borders and naviga-
tion and (4) good prospects for Sino-Soviet reconciliation.
(1) Boundary negotiations are deadlocked: these negotiations
have been held off and on at the vice-ministerial level in Peking in
strict secrecy since October, 1969, with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Ilyichev. To date, neither side has agreed on an agenda, and each re-
mains in basic disagreement about what the talks should cover.
Briefly stated, there are two obstacles to achieving an accord: (a)
China's insistence on reaching an agreement on provisional measures
to maintain the status quo and stop armed conflict before the negotia-
tions on the boundary alignment, and (b) China's repeated demand
that Russia acknowledge for the record that the present Sino-Soviet
boundary is the result of "unequal treaties" imposed on China by the
Czars, and that a new "equal treaty" should be concluded instead.
The Soviets have refused to accede to these main points'" and
have only expressed a willingness to make minor adjustments in partic-
ular frontier areas where boundaries and geography are in obvious
conflict. According to Chou En-lai, the Russians even refuse to recog-
nize "objective facts like the existence of disputed areas."1 6
On April 3, 1979, when China announced the decision not to re-
new the thirty-year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assist-
ance 166 which will expire in 1980, the government stated that China
would be prepared to talk about outstanding issues. Russia, although
at first denouncing the Chinese decision not to renew the treaty, re-
sponded favorably within a few days. Observers noted that as China is
pressing ahead with four modernization programs, it would be benefi-
cial if tensions on the Soviet border could be lessened. 167
On July 19, 1979, the Soviet embassy in Peking announced that
Russia and China had agreed upon negotiations for improving their
relations. 168 The talks took place in late September, with the site alter-
nating between Peking and Moscow. China had agreed to the Soviet
164. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1975, § 1, at 13, col. I.
165. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1973, at 1, col. 7.
166. Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, supra note 5.
167. N.Y. Times, May 23, 1979, at A3, col. I.
168. Wall Street Journal, July 19, 1979, at 1, col. 3.
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proposal, possibly without preconditions, as Brezhnev had wanted in
previous meetings.
(2) An issue closely related to the boundary problem is the non-
aggression pact proposal. On September 24, 1973, Leonid I. Brezhnev
in a speech in the Central Asian city of Tashkent declared that the
Soviet Union offered China a non-aggression pact in mid-June but the
Chinese leaders failed to reply.'69 He also challenged Chou En-lai to
follow up his recent statement of desiring normal relations with Mos-
cow by taking concrete actions.170
On November 7, 1974, in reply to the Kremlin leader's challenge,
Chou asked for a non-aggression meeting, but linked the idea to a pull-
back of forces along the disputed frontier. This concept had been re-
jected by Brezhnev as "absolutely unacceptable" in a speech in Ulan
Bator in 1974 on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Mongolia's
proclamation of a people's republic, only 750 miles from Peking.'
(3) In the 1950's, when Russia and China had friendly relations,
the Chinese designated the Amur River as the River of Friendship.
During that decade, both the Soviet and the Chinese boats traded
across the Argun, Amur and Ussuri rivers. Navigation procedures
were established by the joint Sino-Soviet Commission for Navigation
on Boundary Rivers in 1951.172 The Commission met alternately in
Soviet and Chinese border cities. Regarding the riverine boundary
question, the agreement stipulated that traffic in the rivers should fol-
low the main navigational channels regardless of their relationship to
the state frontier.'73 A later agreement relaxed the shipping and navi-
gation rules to "mutually provide preferential treatment."' 74 Both
sides would "take measures in providing gratis whatever transit serv-
ices are possible for the merchant ships of the two countries-any time
of the day as well as night during the navigation season."'175
As discussed above, one of the factors leading to the 1969 Ussuri
border clashes was that China issued some new stringent boundary
river regulations. On June 7, 1969, as a measure for de-escalating the
tension of the Sino-Soviet relations, the Peking Government agreed to
169. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1973, at 1, coL 5.
170. Id.
171. The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 27, 1974, at 1, col. 2.
172. D. JOHNSTON & HUNGDAH CHIU, AGREEMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBuC OF
CHINA 1949-1967: A CALENDAR 5 (1968).
173. Id.
174. Id. (Agreement of Dec. 1957) at 76.
175. Jen-Min Jih-Pao, Dec. 23, 1957; Munthe-kaas, Amur Amendments, FAR EASTERN
ECONOMIC REVIEW 556 (May 26, 1966).
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the Soviet proposal of May 23 to reopen meetings of the joint Sino-
Soviet Commission for Navigation on Boundary Rivers at Khabarovsk
on June 18.176
A later development was the Chinese charge of July 8, 1969, that
Soviet forces had violated Chinese territory by intruding into Pacha
Island in the Amur River near Khabarovsk. Moscow replied that the
incident was a Chinese "provocation" designed to abort the river-navi-
gation negotiations. 177 But this time the Chinese heeded the Soviet
protest and reached an agreement with the Soviets at the Khabarovsk
conference on the governing of navigation of the border rivers for that
year. 78 Further talks regarding the matter were scheduled for 1970.179
Like the general border negotiations in Peking, the Khabarovsk
conference on river navigation was fruitless for nearly five years. On
May 23, 1974, the Soviets suddenly became more conciliatory and re-
ceptive to the Chinese request for the use of an alternate channel in
order to avoid using the seasonal low water channel along the conflu-
ence of the Ussuri and Amur near the city of Khabarovsk. t80
The Chinese and the Soviets did not hold the first border river
meeting until August 12, 1977; it had taken three years to establish the
meetings. It was reported that the Chinese were seeking improved pas-
sage for their vessels at the junction of the Amur and Ussuri rivers."81
On October 7, 1977, Moscow and Peking news agencies an-
nounced that they had reached limited agreement on rules of naviga-
tion on the Ussuri River on their disputed border. 182 According to the
agreement, Chinese vessels would be permitted to pass through the
north channel of the Ussuri around the Hsia-tzu Islands, where the Us-
sufi and Amur rivers meet, in spite of the Soviet claim that the channel
lay within its territory. "Both sides made it clear when they resumed
these talks in the summer that they were focusing on very technical
navigation problems and nothing else."'' 8 3 Apparently the agreement
176. Text of agreement reprintedin 12 PEKING REVIEW 3 (May 16, 1969).
177. 0. CLUBB, supra note 48, at 404.
178. Id. at 506.
179. Id.
180. N.Y. Times, May 24, 1974, at 5, col. 1. Some observers presented the theory that it
was designed by the Soviets to put more public pressure on Peking to release a captured
Soviet helicopter and its crew, which had strayed into China's Sinkiang region on March 14,
1974. The Chinese claimed the helicopter was on an espionage mission; the Russians said it
was on a mercy flight to help an ailing bodyguard.
181. N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1977, at 4, col. 4.
182. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1977, at 8, col. 3.
183. Id.
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does not affect the larger problem of the Chinese territorial claims
against Russia. Still it is a significant step toward reconciliation be-
tween the two Communist governments.
(4) The analysis presented above persuades this writer to specu-
late that there are good prospects for a Sino-Soviet reconciliation.
With the question of river navigation settled, the Chinese and the Sovi-
ets should be ready to move to solve their general territorial issues.
There are indications that a resolution of the general territorial issues
can be achieved. First, on October 27, 1973, Chou En-lai reaffirmed
that China had never expressed the desire to recover "all the territo-
ries" lost to Russian control during the 19th century as a result of "une-
qual treaties." ' 4 The Russians, however, insisted that China had made
such a claim. As recently as December 1975, the Soviet press still cited
the inflated figure of 1.5 million square kilometers (600,000 square
miles) as that claimed by China, but on April 28, 1976, a Pravda article
conceded that the Chinese territorial claim involved 33,000 square kilo-
meters (about 13,000 square miles).185 The reduction in the size of the
disputed area was a significant concession, which provides both sides
with a reasonable basis for negotiation and greatly narrows the areas of
dispute.
In May 1978, a border incident occurred in Hulin County of Hei-
lungkiang Province. 86 The Chinese claimed that a Soviet helicopter,
18 boats, and 30 soldiers landed on the Chinese bank and penetrated
two and a half miles inland, shooting and wounding a number of peo-
ple. After receiving the Chinese note of protest, the Soviets quickly
offered an apology, but said a border patrol had mistakenly landed on
the Chinese river bank in search of an "armed criminal." The Chinese
disputed the Soviet version of the incident but made no further de-
mands.'87 The Chinese not only refrained from armed counter-attack
but also settled the issue amicably.
China in 1979 is in the hands of pragmatic leaders, such as Hua
Kuo-feng, 8  Teng Hsiao-ping,18 9 and Chan Yun,19° all different from
those in power in the late 1960's. The present leaders urge modemiza-
184. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1973, at 8, coL 1.
185. N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1976, at 10, coL 1.
186. N.Y. Times, May 12, 1978, at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times, May 14, 1978, § 1, at 3, col. 3.
See also Maxwell, Why the Russians Lffied the Blockade at Bear Island, FOREIGN AFFAias
138-45 (Fall 1978).
187. N.Y. Times, May 14, 1978, § 1, at 3, col. 3.
188. Hua Kuo-feng, Chinese Communist Party Chairman and Premier.
189. Tan Hsiao-ping, Vice-Premier.
190. Chan Yun, Vice-Premier (also considered to be a powerful economic figure).
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tions to make China a 20th century world power. Lessening the north-
ern border tension and accommodating to a certain extent the border
issues are equal measures in achieving modernization. On the other
hand, the Soviet opportunity for preemptive strikes against China has
considerably diminished since the Chinese exploded atomic bombs in
1964 and tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in 1971. In
other words, the Soviets have lost their great military superiority. In-
ternationally, China has improved relations not only with the United
States and Japan, but also with the Common Market countries in West-
ern Europe as well as with India, leaving Vietnam on the southern bor-
der as the only adversary besides Russia.
The possibility of a full scale war between China and Russia is
greatly reduced but the road of reconciliation leading toward a compre-
hensive settlement of the borderland issues is long and treacherous.
Should there be a Sino-Soviet conflict, the result would not only under-
mine Soviet predominance in Eastern Europe but could split the world
Communist movement along racial lines and even totally destroy the
movement itself without guaranteeing an end to the conflict. 9'
VI. Possible Settlements
There is no doubt that the Soviet Union has long had a basic stra-
tegic interest in Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang, and this remains
true today. On the other hand, any Chinese Government which aims
to unify China also wishes to exercise full control over these border-
lands. As Mongolia is becoming more aligned with Russia, the entire
Chinese frontier is becoming a region of direct confrontation between
the two highly dynamic nationalistic states. The Chinese borderlands
are so insecure that they are exposed to Russian attacks at any time and
Soviet borderlands are similarly exposed.
The Chinese northern border situation has been very tense and
dangerous, with or without China's territorial claims against the Soviet
Union. So far as the Chinese negotiating principles are concerned,
Russia will not back down. Historically speaking, the Soviet with-
drawal from Manchuria and Sinkiang in 1955 was very unusual. At
present, Russia will not discuss further retreat by granting concessions
to Mao's sweeping territorial claims without a war.
In this writer's opinion, peaceful negotiations seem possible only
in the following areas:
(a) in the Pamir area where the Chinese claim that Russia has oc-
191. TAI SUNG AN, THE SINO-SoVIET TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 124 (1973).
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cupied more than 20,000 square kilometers of Chinese territory in vio-
lations of the stipulations of the Protocol on Sino-Russian Boundary in
the Kashgar Region, 192
(b) in the sector of the Ussuri and Amur Rivers where the Chinese
charge Russia with violating the treaties of Aigun193 and Peking", by
drawing the boundary line along the Chinese bank, thus causing some
600 islands amounting to 1,000 square kilometers to become Soviet ter-
ritory; and
(c) in the area of the Ill boundary in Sinkiang where, by the 1881
Treaty of St. Petersburg, 9 ' Russia retained some territory near Ill even
though there had been a promise to return all the occupied area to
China in 1871.196
Outer Mongolia remains the knotty problem. It shields almost a
third of the length of the Sino-Soviet frontier. But the Nationalist and
Communist Chinese have claimed it as a part of China. From a purely
geographical point of view, China looked like a heart; now, without
Outer Mongolia, the heart shape is incomplete. In a way, when
Mongolia is in enemy hands, it becomes a dagger in China's heart. In
1864, when General Tso Tsung-tang' 97 advocated the military recovery
of Sinkiang, he argued that "to recover Sinkiang is for the protection of
Mongolia, [and] to protect Mongolia is for the safety of the national
capital." 9 ' In other words, Mongolia is vital for Peking's own safety.
But, having no alternative, both the Nationalist and Communist
regimes have accepted the independent status of Outer Mongolia. In
1962, a boundary agreement was reached with the Chinese favoring the
Mongolians all along the lengthy border with Sinkiang and Inner
Mongolia.'99 Perhaps the best result China can hope to achieve now is
to convert Outer Mongolia into a buffer zone by matching Russian in-
fluence in Ulan Bator.
192. Id. at 115.
193. Treaty of Aigun, supra note 35.
194. Treaty of Peking, supra note 36.
195. Treaty of St. Petersburg, supra note 38.
196. L. CHANG, CHUNG WAI TtAo YUEH TsUNG LUN (TREATY RELATIONS BETwEEN
CHINA AND FOREIGN POWERS) 33 (1970). This is the author's work dealing with the Chi-
nese treaty relations with foreign powers from 1689 to the mid 1950's.
197. Tso, an able Chinese general, was charged with recovery of Sinkiang in 1875.
198. L. CHANG, supra note 196.
199. At present, the Chinese-Mongolian boundary agreement has not been officially
translated and published by either government. But it was understood that in most in-
stances, the Chinese abandoned their claims in favor of the Mongols. Cf. F. WATSON, supra
note 26, at 173-76. However, for the Chinese text, see Chung Hwa Jen Ming Kung Ho Kuo
Tiao-Yueh Tsi (PRC, Collections of Treaties) Series II, 1962, at 19-36.
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There is another territory closely related to Outer Mongolia: Uri-
anghai, generally known as Tannu Tuva, in the northwest, which
China could well claim. The area involves 64,000 square miles, a pop-
ulation of 70,000, and considerable natural resources. The Tahcheng
Protocol2°" (or Tarbagatai), though it principally dealt with the Sino-
Russian frontier in Sinkiang, touched upon the northern frontier of
Outer Mongolia. Later the Russians claimed that Urianghai was
within the Chinese dominions. The Russians, however, first occupied it
in 1911 in connection with the support of the Outer Mongolian auton-
omy movement. Three years later, they detached it as a Russian pro-
tectorate. The Chinese troops recovered it when they returned to Outer
Mongolia after the Russian Revolution. In 1922, however, the Russian
army was able to create a communist regime in Outer Mongolia and a
"Tuvanian People's Republic" in Urianghai. By 1944, it was absorbed
into the Soviet Union as an autonomous region and later as an autono-
mous republic. 201 The Republic of China has never ceased protesting
this situation and has claimed the region in her maps. Both the 1945202
and 1950203 treaties with the Soviets ignored the problem; but the Pe-
king Government could certainly reassert her claim with a strong case.
A commentator has described the Soviet-Chinese differences as
"the Coldest War" and has maintained that "[w]hen historians in the
year 2000 look back on the final quarter of this century, they will see
that it was the present Sino-Soviet relationship that has shaped their
world.'
2°4
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, has
underscored the vulnerability of the borderlands continguous to the So-
viet Union. The Soviet actions have given credibility to Mao Tse-
tung's concern about China's security. Indeed, frontier security dis-
putes are shaping the world today.
200. Tahcheng Protocol, supra note 37, at 462-78.
201. See CHIANG KAI-SHEK, supra note 1.
202. Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, supra note 3.
203. Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, rupra note 5.
204. C. SULZBERGER, THE COLDEST WAR: RusSIA'S GAME IN CHINA 6 (1974).
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